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There is no human being who is not the product of every social 
experience, every process of education. . . Indeed, even if it 
were possible, a judge free of this heritage of past experience 
would probably lack the very qualities of humanity required of 
a judge. Rather, the wisdom required of a judge is to recognize, 
consciously allow for, and perhaps to question, all the baggage 
of past attitudes and sympathies that fellow citizens are free to 
carry, untested, to the grave.
True impartiality does not require that the judge have no 
sympathies or opinions; it requires that the judge nevertheless 
be free to entertain and act upon different points of view with 
an open mind. . . Canadian Judicial Council
Commentaries on Judicial Conduct (1991)
You cannot just ‘write the truth,’ you have to write it for and to 
somebody, somebody who can do something with it.
Bertolt Brecht “Writing the Truth: Five Diffi culties”
To promote legal cultures that fulfi ll their mandate to create and sus-
tain a democratic society requires rethinking conceptual, institution-
al, cultural, legal, and other boundaries. If culture is what people do 
habitually and hence often unthinkingly, then cultural critique means 
probing the terms, rationality, and knowledge a particular culture takes 
for granted, and/or enthusiastically imposes on those it colonizes. Only 
in understanding culture in the plural and as a set of historically con-
tingent practices and protocols can we develop means of improving or 
replacing what at a particular time and place seems to be the sole or 
the “natural” way to think, act, and interact. Only by doing so can we 
confront “privileged innocence” (McIntyre) and overcome “the wall 
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of ignorance” (Ndebele 336) constructed by colonial apparatuses and 
dominant knowledge paradigms that sustain domination. And the de-
colonization of a postcolonial law and literature worthy of the name 
can proceed effectively only with the assistance and authority of those 
construed as colonized others, as Paulo Freire among others has argued, 
and in the space “between law and custom” recently mapped by Peter 
Karsten for the “lands of the British diaspora.”
My purpose in sharing my experience as a non-Aboriginal woman 
trained in literary study and cultural theory, teaching interdisciplinary 
seminars in a Law College, and working collaboratively with Aboriginal 
scholars is to try to rearticulate legal and literary thinking/teaching in 
order to further the reciprocal acculturation of Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal precepts and practices the Supreme Court of Canada seeks in 
recent groundbreaking decisions, including Van der Peet, Delgamuukw, 
and Gladue. These decisions show how inadequate to the task of dis-
mantling ideological obstructions and enabling a postcolonial justice are 
the autonomy and good intentions of the Court. Yet it is a task in which 
we all have an interest—and an obligation and opportunity to use our 
knowledge and to learn from Aboriginal scholars and writers (to whose 
work I am greatly indebted) to make a difference. We have all, though 
not equally, been affected by what Mi’kmaw scholar Marie Battiste calls 
“cognitive imperialism” and have much to gain from “unfolding the les-
sons of colonization,” learning from diverse perspectives, and seeing 
“the many sides of our confi nement, our box” (xvi–xvii). Source of and 
sanction for the brutal simplicities of complex identities collapsed into 
the crude calculus of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal difference, for ex-
ample, that colonial box constructs cultural divides that keep us fi rmly 
within the status quo. Unpacking the historical inscription of cultural 
divides and the law’s participation in the creation of difference is the be-
ginning of redress. As Njabulo S. Ndebele argues, “It is justice we must 
demand, not guilt. . . . The demand for justice . . . is more immediately 
and concretely threatening: it keeps our attention fi rmly on the search for 
the actual process of redress.” To do otherwise, Ndebele concludes, is to 
neglect the past so “deeply embedded in the present” and “to postpone 
the future” (340–43). 
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As my epigraphs suggest, I am interested in intellectual and social 
formations and what they can mean for decision-making and the dis-
semination of knowledge useful within and beyond the academy, within 
internally confl icted yet cohesive communities. When writers and re-
searchers deny the relational nature of all identity and meaning, and 
the embeddedness of discourses in larger cultural contexts, disciplinary 
strength (or depth and breadth) doubles as sterility. When such writ-
ers and researchers operate in enclaves, they are obstructed by the very 
institutional structures that remain unexamined because apparently so 
“natural” or “proper” and incidentally lucrative. 
It is here that a postcolonial interdisciplinary law and literature, a 
form of Gayatri Spivak’s disciplinary “interruption” (21), can useful-
ly unsettle disciplinary formations, terms, and assumptions and help 
unpack and unsettle more thoroughly Eurocentric systems within law 
and literature—systems that sustain oppression and suppress relational-
ity without acknowledging their own role in the process. Such oppres-
sive systems remain fi rmly in place in legal and educational institutions 
where Aboriginal or Indigenous knowledge is too often treated as at best 
a supplement to Eurocentric thought—the privileges and priorities of 
which are as invisible as they seem natural and benign:
Alienation is to the oppressed what self-righteousness is to the 
oppressor. Each really believes that their unequal relationship 
is part of the natural order of things or desires by some higher 
power. The dominator does not feel that he is exercising unjust 
power and the dominated do not feel the need to withdraw 
from his tutelage. The dominator will even believe, in all good 
faith, that he is looking out for the good of the dominated, 
while the latter will insist that they want an authority more en-
lightened than their own to determine their fate. (Noël 79)2
While recent decisions offer important new paradigms, the Courts 
have evidently gone as far as they can within legal protocols to recon-
ceive terms and categories to achieve redress and now look to dialogue 
across disciplines and cultures to help think through issues of author-
ity, identity, and difference. If culture has always supported and supple-
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mented the law’s efforts to regulate human behaviour, legal studies has 
not always been attentive to the defi ning characteristics of its relation to 
the broader culture(s) it inhabits and purports to serve.3 If legal argu-
ment too depends on the culture of the expert, on the academic capac-
ity to present argument, it is a culture and dependency so habitual as to 
resist and resent conscious and critical scrutiny. All this despite the chal-
lenges and best efforts of Critical Legal Studies, Critical Race Theory, 
and Feminist Legal Studies.4 What remains invisible is the complicity of 
knowledge economies—buttressed by an exaggerated faith in (predomi-
nantly White male) expert testimony—in producing and reproducing 
identities and difference, inequalities and injustices. 
The result is that Aboriginal peoples in the justice system are reduced 
to objects of the expert gaze, “preserved, dissected, analysed, written-
about, and, above all, owned, controlled, appropriated” (Wright 117), 
their experiential or local knowledge rendered invalid even as they are 
forced to bear the burden of proof. The expert gaze, as Frantz Fanon 
argues, repeats the “perverse logic” of colonialism whereby it “distorts, 
disfi gures, and destroys” the “past of an oppressed people” (qtd. in 
Lawrence 23) and creates what Mi’kmaw professor Bonita Lawrence 
calls the “stick fi gures” of non-Indigenous acts of excavation (24). 
When Aboriginal peoples “say today that they have had to go to court 
to prove they exist, they are speaking not just poetically, but also liter-
ally” (Culhane 48). And there is no denying the costs of such defensive 
postures and the charges of special pleading they typically entail. What 
Mohawk professor Patricia Monture-Angus recommends is a refocus-
ing of energies and analyses, “turning the conversation around so that 
Canada is required to be accountable for the wrongs it has perpetuated 
. . . . an articulation of their role rather than a repackaging of Aboriginal 
thought” (Thunder 253). 
Thus, as important as interdisciplinary work to progressive scholar-
ship and transformative practice are Aboriginal modes of thinking and 
experiencing that understand themselves as always already relational, 
and do so within historically specifi c understandings of socially orga-
nized power. Only with such assistance can the Courts “entertain and 
act upon different points of view with an open mind,” as the Canadian 
167
Towa rd s  a  Po s t co l o n i a l  L aw  and  L i t e r a tu re
Judicial Council advises, and achieve that “enlargement of mind” that 
the Court considers “not only consistent with impartiality,” but also 
“its essential precondition” (R.D.S. at para. 42). If there is no avoiding 
power imbalances or the pattern of inclusion/exclusion in any institu-
tional structure or power-knowledge matrix, we still have options other 
than repeating the patterns of the past. Aboriginal activism’s double ges-
ture of working within and against dominant theories and structures of 
legitimacy (Smith; Battiste) can help bring about postcolonial justice if 
we connect landmark legal judgments to their cultural antecedents and 
consequences in the so-called old and new humanities. 
If the history of English Studies is deeply implicated in forms of inter-
nal and external colonization (Baldick; Hunter; Willinsky, for example), 
Cultural Studies, feminist, and postcolonial studies have done much to 
retrieve that history and redress its effects. Each of these projects em-
phasizes productive mediation, contexts of power, and the complex ex-
change involved in making meaning, extending understanding, and as-
signing value and status. Challenging traditional distinctions between 
high and low culture or between the marginal and the central, these 
so-called new humanities—and particularly the Indigenous humanities 
(see Len Findlay)—stress too the researcher’s/ writer’s responsibility for 
those framings of projects that help create and shape what many claim 
to discover existing fully formed “out there.” Far from disavowing power 
or retreating into research or art for its own sake, teacher-scholars in 
these areas actively work for more equitable participation in education 
and in a more diverse yet just society. Decolonizing methodologies, for 
Maori academic Linda Tuhiwai Smith, for instance, means challenging 
dominating universals, resisting the “systemic fragmentation” of disci-
plinary knowledges, and researching back “with a view to rewriting and 
rerighting our position in history” and settling “some business of the 
modern” (28–34). 
Let me illustrate some of these general contentions by way of specifi c 
examples from the law and literature, beginning with three Supreme 
Court of Canada decisions before turning to legal education and the 
rich source of useful knowledge to be found in the Aboriginal cultural 
archive and current cultural renaissance. Although in the 1996 Van der 
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Peet decision, centering on the defi nition of Aboriginal rights recog-
nized and affi rmed by s.35 (1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, the Court 
explicitly cautions that “Aboriginal rights cannot . . . be defi ned on the 
basis of the philosophical precepts of the liberal enlightenment” (para. 
19), it remains unable to attend equally to the authority of different 
legal cultures. The decision is structured around secure notions of the 
central and marginal or incidental, difference reduced to the singularity 
of “the Aboriginal perspective” (emphasis added) feminized in its asso-
ciation with sensitivity and its opposition to non-Aboriginal knowledge 
and expertise. Following the Dickson Court in the 1990 Sparrow deci-
sion, the Court agrees that it is “crucial to be sensitive to the Aboriginal 
perspective itself on the meaning of the rights at stake” (at para. 49, 
citing Sparrow p. 1112). Yet, that Aboriginal perspective must be “cog-
nizable to the Canadian legal and constitutional structure” (at para. 49). 
Signifi cantly, despite an avowed concern with the specifi cs of the case, 
the appellant (Dorothy Marie Van der Peet, a member of the Sto:lo 
nation “charged with selling [ten] fi sh caught under the authority of 
an Indian food fi sh licence, contrary to s.27 (5) of the British Columbia 
Fishery (general) Regulations, SOR/84-248” ) is quickly obscured in the 
generalizing categorizing of legal discourse concerned with the fi xing 
of Aboriginal identity, with developing “a basic analytical framework 
for constitutional claims of Aboriginal right protection under s.35.1” 
of the Constitution Act, 1982 and with the retrieving of some “pristine 
Aboriginal society,” as Justice L’Heureux-Dubé comments in her dissent 
(paras. 131 and 168). 
The new test increases the burden of proof regarding Aboriginal rights, 
adding to the Sparrow test in the most abstract and impossible of terms: 
“an activity must be an element of practice, custom or tradition integral 
to the distinctive culture of the Aboriginal group claiming the right” and 
be “central to the Aboriginal societies that existed in North America 
prior to contact with the Europeans” while manifesting “continuity with” 
those customs etc. “that existed prior to contact” and “cannot be simply 
as an incident” (paras. 44–46; 55–63; emphasis added). In elaborating 
the test, the Court invokes the unquestioned authority of the Concise 
Oxford Dictionary on the distinction between distinct and distinctive—
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 despite recent studies of the history of the OED and the ideological ac-
tivity of dictionary making more generally (Willinsky).5
Nor could Delgamuukw act on its efforts to achieve a new judicial 
analysis placing “equal weight” on different legal cultures, oral and writ-
ten evidence. Although the Court took a bold step in recognizing the 
importance of culture and modes of crosscultural encounter and ex-
change in modern as well as traditional societies, it could not break with 
colonial thinking that depends on false polarities whereby oral storytell-
ing is relegated to an exoticized cultural realm while written documenta-
ry history is constructed as authoritative and truthful. The Court insists 
that “the trial judge’s assessment of expert witnesses must be shown due 
deference” (para. 78), but nowhere is there sensitivity to the construc-
tion of expertise (and its need of its other—myth, fi ction, untruth)—or 
to the exaggerated suspicion of oral evidence (Magner 68) and story in 
“dominant knowledge paradigms” (Razack Looking 36–55). In citing 
uncritically—and incompletely—the Report of the Royal Commission 
on Aboriginal Peoples (vol. 1, 33), the Court re-inscribes the opposition, 
“objective” written history/ “subjective” oral testimony even as it tries to 
respect oral history equally. The Court overlooks RCAP’s emphasis on 
the myth of progress underpinning traditional western humanist histo-
riography, its presumptions about the naturalness of its separations (“the 
scientifi c from what is religious or spiritual”), its investment in distance 
and linearity, and the contrasts (“rich and complex” rather than “ab-
solute”) between “Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal historical traditions” 
with “different purposes for revisiting the past, different methodologies 
and different content and forms” (vol. 1, 35). The Court likewise over-
looks an endnote that warns about the presumption that oral accounts 
need validating in the written record, recommends an understanding of 
“the broader cultural and institutional contexts from which the oral his-
tory and the documentary record come,” and concludes that “divergent 
histories” be resolved “by mutually respectful negotiation” (vol. 1,  40–
41). Thus, traditional disciplinary authority proves a major roadblock to 
new judicial thinking (Findlay “Just” 52–54). 
Despite the best intentions of the Court, it (like the traditional law 
school) remains confi ned within the very enlightenment reasoning that 
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the legal and literary canon sustains (and is sustained by) and that the 
Court knows cannot properly defi ne Aboriginal rights or render justice 
for Aboriginal peoples (Van der Peet at para. 19; Gladue at paras. 33–
34).6 Aboriginal peoples in 1997 represented 12% of the prison popu-
lation but only 3% of Canada’s population; Saskatchewan’s fi gures are 
an appalling 72% and 12% respectively [Gladue para. 58]). Though the 
US has the highest rates of incarceration at 649 inmates per 100,000 
(Bauman 115), Canada is another world leader at 130 per 100,000 
(Gladue para. 52). In registering these sorry statistics, the Court cites 
approvingly the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Bridging the 
Cultural Divide:
The Canadian criminal justice system has failed the Aboriginal 
peoples of Canada—First Nations, Inuit and Métis people, 
on-reserve and off-reserve, urban and rural—in all territorial 
and governmental jurisdictions. The principal reason for this 
crushing failure is the fundamentally different world views of 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people with respect to such ele-
mental issues as the substantive content of justice and the pro-
cess of achieving justice. (Cit. Gladue at para. 62)
But such a recognition treats these “different world views” as pre-
 existent, stable, and self-evident without understanding the history of 
the production and reproduction of difference.7
The Gladue decision is itself striking evidence of the Court’s deter-
mination to alter “the method of analysis” (para. 33) in order to ad-
dress the disproportionate incarceration of Aboriginal peoples by at-
tending to their exceptional circumstances, as required by s 718.2(e) of 
the Criminal Code: 
All available sanctions other than imprisonment that are rea-
sonable in the circumstances should be considered for all of-
fenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of ab-
original offenders. 
While the Court strives to attend respectfully to those exceptional 
circumstances, give the mandated “fair, large and liberal construction 
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and interpretation,” and give “real force” to remedial objectives (paras. 
32–34), it has failed to do so effectively. It remains confi ned by inherited 
Eurocentric categories of identity, motivation, and relevant circumstanc-
es, reducing the life of nineteen-year-old Aboriginal woman Jamie Tanis 
Gladue to social symptoms (poverty, abuse, educational and economic 
disadvantage) severed from their historical sources, individual from col-
lective experience, private from public, present from past circumstances. 
The Court’s determined “impartiality” ironically blinds it to persistent 
biases that read to confi rm existing beliefs about relevant circumstances 
and Aboriginal heritage without learning from the knowledge accumu-
lated over centuries by Aboriginal peoples to revalue the “Indigenous 
Difference” (Macklem) and develop a more effectively healing legal her-
meneutic. 
Without coming to terms with the intersecting systems of domina-
tion, sexism and racism, and the particular histories of colonization, the 
Court cannot comprehend the circumstances that gave rise to the events 
in the life of Jamie Gladue sentenced to three years’ imprisonment for 
manslaughter in the killing (on her nineteenth birthday) of her twenty-
year-old common law husband Reuben Beaver. Effectively, the Court iso-
lates the appellant from the histories of her community and the violence 
of colonial experience. Instead the Court locates issues within bourgeois 
notions of “the spousal relationship,” and blames her as “the aggressor,” 
although she was fi ve months pregnant and Beaver had already been 
convicted for assaulting her, while focusing on her need to correct her 
“problem” with alcohol. The result is that the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal decision is upheld and the appeal dismissed.8
Though for its efforts in such decisions, the Supreme Court has found 
itself accused of activism and reverse racism,9 it has struggled to change 
its terms and evidentiary standards. It has thus struggled to live up to its 
fi duciary duty to Aboriginal peoples and the constitutional recognition 
of Aboriginal rights and the Court’s obligation to render “a generous and 
liberal interpretation” of the constitutional provision, resolve ambigu-
ity “in favor of Aboriginal peoples,” and “be sensitive to the aboriginal 
perspective on the meaning of the rights at stake” (Van der Peet at paras. 
24–49). In rethinking those terms and evidentiary standards, the Court 
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might profi tably attend to those who have written about dominant 
terms of engagement in Canadian society. Writing about the invisibility 
and elasticity of the whiteness that constitutes Canadian nation-build-
ing and legitimates its “myth-making intellectual elite,” Dionne Brand 
comments on the particular challenges facing those “excluded” from 
Canadian whiteness and especially the diffi culties of protecting opposi-
tional terms from co-optation by the state. In this context, “excluded”—
already too benign a term “for the denial of history”—is but one of a 
number of terms that have become “bureaucratic glosses for human suf-
fering,” while preserving white privilege and its “innocence.” From her 
perspective, “Access, representation, inclusion, exclusion, equity. All are 
other ways of saying race in this country without saying that we live in a 
deeply racialised and racist culture”(175–79). Monture-Angus is similar-
ly concerned to reject dominant terms, including the divisive categories 
of the Indian Act, that keep people fi ghting for “assorted crumbs, rather 
than spending [their] energy shedding the shackles of [their] colonial 
oppression” (“Standing” 89–90). Refl ecting on the mandate (“equality 
of opportunities for women”) of the Royal Commission on the Status of 
Women in Canada, legal scholar and now provincial court judge Mary 
Ellen Turpel-Lafond deconstructs culturally inappropriate dominant 
discourses that install White men as the measure of all things:
Equality is simply not the central organizing political principle 
in our communities. It is frequently seen by our Elders as a sus-
piciously selfi sh notion, as individualistic and alienating from 
others in the community. (180)
What is more, equality as sameness discourses have a habit of con-
veniently eliding the history of inequalities. Anatole France is but one 
of many critics who have shown the irrationality of the formal equal-
ity principles of the law that ignore as they legitimate unequal socio-
 economic and other relations:
The law in all its majestic impartiality forbids both rich and 
poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets and to 
steal bread. (qtd. in Hunt 184)10 
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Helpful in understanding legal education’s role in the sort of impass-
es experienced by the Court is African-American legal scholar Patricia 
Williams who challenges legal discourse and rationalities and their pre-
tensions to universal truths by considering them not within “the four 
corners of a document” but within the broader framework of the dis-
ciplines of “psychology, sociology, history, criticism, and philosophy.” 
Her belief is that “theoretical legal understanding and social trans-
formation need not be oxymoronic”; that legal theory need not be a 
matter of “exclusive categories and defi nitional polarities” (8–9). Yet 
her work has been dismissed as “trendy” and “marginal”—or “nice and 
poetic”: “This is a law review, after all. This is just a matter of style,” 
claimed one editor supporting his editorial changes (7, 48). Even stu-
dents concluded that what Williams taught was “not law” (95). But 
from Williams’ point of view, “formalized, color-blind, liberal ideals” 
of legal writing ensure “an aesthetic of uniformity, in which difference 
is simply omitted” (48). The enabling (and enabled) fi ction of neutral-
ity, the myth of “a disinterested knowledge” that John Barrell identifi es 
with “a particular social class” (92) as well as gender and race, explains 
the backlash against her own efforts to include those disadvantaged by 
a system that marginalizes the many by universalizing the experience of 
the few. One of the troubling consequences is the distorted public per-
ception that “blacks commit most of the crimes” despite U. S. Bureau 
of Justice Statistics for 1986 that show whites accounting for 71.7 per-
cent of all crimes and all others responsible for the remaining 28% 
(Williams 73). Such distorted perception is replicated here in Canada 
where crime is racialized, the work of alien or infantile others threaten-
ing the social fabric, and white crime rendered relatively invisible. The 
result is such claims as these:
Unfortunately, these days most of the murderers seem to be 
Black. . . . Are we a society of racists? Certainly not. It’s just 
that White Canadians are understandably fed up with people 
they see as outsiders, coming into their country and beating 
and killing them. (Maharj, Toronto Star, 15 April 1994; qtd. in 
Henry and Tator 3)
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Although statistics are banned, everybody knows the tale they 
tell: Young Black men are responsible for a disproportionate 
amount of violent crime in Toronto. (John Barber, Globe and 
Mail 12 April 1994: A3; qtd. in Henry and Tator 171) 
To illustrate how legal education itself “makes invisible white crimi-
nality” (88), Williams considers how an exam in criminal law can “con-
veystereotypes, delimit the acceptable, and formulate ideals” (85) by 
asking students to “individualize the test” of provocation in a scenario 
based on Shakespeare’s Othello. “The model answer” gave points for rec-
ognizing that “a rough untutored Moor might understandably be de-
ceived by the wiles of a more sophisticated European” (Williams 80; em-
phasis added). When a student complained that the exam was racist 
(not to mention sexist), the professor appealed to Shakespeare’s “facts,” 
while invoking his own academic freedom (84). Especially troubling is 
the way in which the exam “frame” reduces “the facts to . . . racist gen-
eralizations and stereotypes” and, without acknowledging responsibility 
for the “facts,” puts black students in the position of “speaking against” 
themselves (82), “writing against their personal knowledge” and even 
assuming a “racist/sexist/homophobic . . . mentality in order to do well 
in the grading process” (87). Such experience of Eurocentric framing 
is the source of what W. E. B. Dubois termed “double consciousness”: 
“This sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, 
of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused 
contempt and pity” (45). Monture-Angus has refl ected on “the intense 
pain” of similar forms of self-erasure, has faced backlash when she was 
urged to “make this academic and stop feeling for a while, ” and been 
shuffl ed around as a person of colour “to accommodate the White expe-
rience” of a conference (Thunder 24, 19, 25). In such ways hegemony 
induces the marginal to internalize the appropriateness of their own on-
going oppression—or to resist, as in the case of the persistent challenges 
of Monture-Angus’s scholarship to mainstream legal thinking.
In the Canadian academic context, Sheila McIntyre exposes “studied 
ignorance” and “privileged innocence” that uphold the status quo and 
assign to the few power and privilege, and an agency that gives them 
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access to elite institutions and hence the capacity to shape the dominant 
“truths.” Such privilege allows its holders to persist in not knowing, 
in “‘un-knowing’ and ‘un-thinking’ the realities of systemic inequality, 
including our own roles in perpetuating those realities.” As McIntyre 
argues, such “studied ignorance enables and entrenches the freedom of 
the systemically privileged to dissociate themselves from, and presume 
themselves innocent of, the cumulative appropriations and disposses-
sions that defi ne systemic relations of domination” (159). Ian Hingley 
has written powerfully about his own journey of discovery that clarifi ed 
the interdependence of oppressor and oppressed, the systematic depen-
dence of his own power and privilege on the oppression of others, and 
his own responsibilities for the choice to work for change (101–11). 
Unfortunately, Hingley’s story is all too rare. Indeed, the more institu-
tions are invested in the discourses of free inquiry and exchange, critical 
thinking, objectivity, disinterest, and excellence, the less able they are 
ironically to countenance or tolerate, far less promote and value, differ-
ence—the diversity of thinking on complex matters, the diversity of in-
terests people seek to advance, the diversity so crucial to a multicultural 
society and its democratic institutions. It is the so-called “hidden curric-
ulum” (Jackson), what Dorothy Smith calls “relations of ruling” (qtd. in 
Margolis 3), so prominent yet so natural and habitual as to be invisible, 
that masks the particular interests of a disinterest that is an indifference 
to all but the privileges of the status quo. Those who like Williams and 
McIntyre would “out” the system or “who rock the boat risk a painful 
immersion in chilly waters” (Acker 77). Within the academy Aboriginal 
students and faculty are frequently required to write within and take 
their departure from mainstream academic discourse in ways that inten-
sify their sense of alienation (Lawrence 24). 
In helping bridge what the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples 
has called the “cultural divide” between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
legal and literary orders, I draw on one of Canada’s foremost intellectu-
als: Cree playwright Tomson Highway and his Dry Lips Oughta Move 
to Kapuskasing. Highway’s work is a useful corrective to the sort of in-
tercultural sensitivity training available on the market that urges people 
to regard culture as décor or a consolingly consumable version of dif-
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ference (Morrison et al, for example). Far from being enriched or trans-
formed by such instruction, readers will fi nd stereotypes reinforced. 
Further, such thinking underpins much academic discourse where talk 
of becom ing culturally attuned to diversity betrays old colonial habits 
of  harmonizing or assimilating the anomalous to dominant views and 
ways—without exploring its own complicity in systems of domination.
Cultural anthropologist Edward T. Hall’s model of high- and low-
context cultures defi ned in terms of their dependence on the contexts of 
messages has proven a potent means of managing difference and orga-
nizing or fi ltering apprehension of the world so that attention is diverted 
from power relations to ritual and logic (or their absence) and behav-
ioural gestures. In such a model our gaze is drawn to body language and 
eye contact as access to a culture’s meanings and values. Similarly, charts 
of Native and non-Native values are widely used in Canadian judges’ 
training sessions (Razack Looking 184). Legal positivism has nothing to 
fear here. And the dangers of so isolating cultural signs from their his-
tory and social contexts are highlighted by the Special Rapporteur to the 
United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities, Dr. Erica-Irene Daes:
the heritage of an indigenous people is not merely a collection 
of objects, stories and ceremonies, but a complete knowledge 
system with its own concepts of epistemology, philosophy, and 
scientifi c and logical validity. The diverse elements of an indig-
enous people’s heritage can only be fully learned or understood 
by means of the pedagogy traditionally employed by these 
peoples themselves, including apprenticeship, ceremonies and 
practice. Simply recording words or images fails to capture the 
whole context and meaning of songs, rituals, arts or scientifi c 
and medical wisdom. This also underscores the central role of 
indigenous peoples’ own languages through which each peo-
ple’s heritage has traditionally been recorded and transmitted 
from generation to generation. (Para. 8)
As Sherene Razack argues too, cross-cultural communication prob-
lems are not a matter of “technical glitches” or navigating “unchanging 
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essences” but of understanding the history of social relations and the 
ways “an alienating and racist environment” produces behaviours and 
identity (Looking 8–10). Only then will we face the racism that is not 
exceptional but foundational to Western rationality and notions of prog-
ress (Bhabha 41–43). Also, without confronting intersections of sexism 
and racism, we’ll never counter Aboriginal women’s over-representa-
tion in Canadian prison. According to the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of 
Manitoba, Status women are 131 times more likely to be incarcerated 
than white women—and their imprisonment is most often related to a 
history of abuse (Razack Looking 68). 
If English, like the Law, has proven a loyal servant of imperial forma-
tions, it has also, in extending its ambit and authority across cultural, 
national, and other differences, been transformed in the process and 
become a crucial site and symptom of resistance and struggle. African-
American feminist Audre Lorde’s famous challenge—“the master’s tools 
will never dismantle the master’s house” (112)—is not as self-evidently 
helpless and hopeless as many have taken it to be. In a form of linguistic 
determinism, some activists dispatch English from their toolbox with-
out recognizing how it differs from itself in the hands or mouths of 
those who use it otherwise in resistance. In the face of statistics show-
ing only 4—Cree, Inuktitut, Ojibway, and Dakota—of 50 Aboriginal 
languages in Canada with a chance of survival (Ignace, qtd. in Philip 
A6; Statistics Canada 1999), clearly the dominance of English cannot 
be underestimated. Still, tools are transformed by their strategic deploy-
ment for diverse ends, as Metis-Salish writer Lee Maracle suggests when 
she claims, “we’ve taken hold of that language and made it partly our 
own. Instead of an imposition, it’s become our own, and it has a beauty, 
when we use it” (Kelly 79). Likewise Lorde’s emphasis on the master’s 
house directs us to deconstruct and reconstruct institutions to new de-
signs that will liberate the many rather than sustain the luxury of the 
few. As Ruth Wilson Gilmore has argued, this means concentrating on 
“fundamental orderings in political economy. If the master loses control 
of the means of production, he is no longer the master” (70). This for 
me means collaborating across cultures and disciplines (and not accu-
mulating intellectual private property) and communicating in multiple 
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locations inside and outside mainstream institutions to keep connected 
to the crises and contradictions of social conditions. 
Deriving authority and strength from multiple sources entails under-
standing and acting upon a cultural poetics and politics of difference 
such as Highway offers in a wonderfully humorous and unsparingly crit-
ical play that shows us how legal scholars and culture workers alike can 
bridge that “cultural divide.” If we cannot fully understand others’ sto-
ries, we retain some capacity to look, listen, and learn. Highway’s Dry 
Lips Oughta Move to Kapuskasing invites just such looking, listening, and 
learning. Indeed, it is a text that students and I have found enormously 
useful in the context of a Law and Culture seminar—in part because it is 
not a predictable source. It is a text without obvious relevance for those 
interested in law and justice and in the particular challenges to judicial 
thinking of difference as a category of cultural identity. It is a text that 
critiques while refusing to give centre stage to colonial realities that have 
had disproportionate space in the historical record. Instead, the play fo-
cuses on life on the reserve, on Aboriginal heritage, culture, and stories, 
while showing that there is no secure inside or outside to the reserve or 
the identities of community members, no escaping the colonial institu-
tions of education, religion, and the law constructing and reconstruct-
ing identity and difference—and supporting the work of Corrections 
Canada. From the earliest lines, characters are correcting one another, 
preoccupied with past and present violence, with betrayal and bickering, 
pattern and paternity, legitimacy and illegitimacy, inclusion and exclu-
sion, innocence and guilt, ignorance and knowledge, rules and resistance, 
domination and self-determination. Memories of efforts to retrieve his-
torical sites at Wounded Knee, South Dakota, 1973, bring back earlier 
violent confrontations at the Wounded Knee Massacre in 1890, the last 
major clash between federal troops and American Native peoples. 
In an interview Highway has commented on the surprising cultural 
ignorance that has survived highly developed communications technol-
ogy. Outrage at his play taught him that:
non-Native people . . . knew more about the size of Elizabeth 
Taylor’s breasts, Michael Jackson’s most recent nose job and 
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Madonna’s most recent fuck than they did about their own sys-
tems of gods and goddesses. So that a Cree Indian from caribou 
country ended up knowing more about Hera and Zeus [whose 
story is reworked in the play]. . . than the people the stories be-
longed to. (“Let Us Now Combine” 25) 
In another interview Highway has talked about the need to fi ll peo-
ple’s heads not with Greek and Christian mythology but with “our own 
hero stories, our own Weesageechak stories, our own Nanabush sto-
ries, our own incredible times of heroism and tragedy and incredible 
comedy. Because until that day arrives we are going to continue to be 
colonized” (Loucks 9). Still, Highway is not restrained, as the Courts are 
inclined to be, by notions of frozen or authentic traditional culture but 
mixes mythologies and languages (Cree, Ojibway, and English) in order 
to remake meanings, to enrich who we are and help us become who we 
would like to be.
If mainstream audiences were often perplexed by early performanc-
es, Aboriginal women experienced the pain of their representation in 
the play. Anita Tuharsky could fi nd no redeeming qualities in the play, 
“nothing to balance the negativity,” the presentation of Aboriginal 
women as “loose, unfaithful, sleazy drunks,” nothing to correct “the 
damaging stereotypes” of Aboriginal men and women. In short, she 
argued, “Highway’s images only open the wounds and adds salt to them” 
(5, 13). Poet and activist Marie Annharte Baker offers a more nuanced 
but no less troubled review of the play. She understands that some look 
to the play “to educate the public about racism and sexism in a com-
munity in transition,” yet she concludes the play “silenced Aboriginal 
women.” Still, she “had to see it for herself ” and she found laughter as 
“unavoidable” as the determination not to be thought unable to “get it” 
(88). If the play could prove “a wonderful revelation about contradic-
tions in Indian lives” for “whites and white-nosers,” “to a young Indian 
person, the play might be another affront to one’s identity.” Even more 
damaging, Baker wonders if anyone would come away with a better un-
derstanding of sexism and racism or if we are yet able to “describe the 
frontier attitudes toward sex which end in intolerable violence toward 
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women and children. We are still far too willing to participate in the vio-
lent fantasies about us.” Finding “a small comfort to see poison,” Baker 
hopes “the cure doesn’t kill” (89). 
The role of the artist that Highway likens to “the role of the shaman 
in traditional, pre-Christian Indian society” (“Let Us Now Combine,” 
27) is clearly a risky one, especially when the artist plays with taken for 
granted assumptions about cultural and other categories. In his attempts 
to recover “the sacred woman in all of us, a woman and land who have 
been raped, distorted and abused by centuries of exploitation, oppres-
sion and victimization,” Highway “steps harshly on our sensibilities, our 
deepest fears and yet he is constantly urging us to turn around and take 
a second look” (Loucks 11).
His is a play, then, that breaks the silence of shame and self-blame and 
moves Aboriginal people to speech and action while exposing cycles of 
abuse and connecting individual and collective histories to current re-
sponsibilities in Aboriginal as well as non-Aboriginal societies. It does 
so by having the trickster-teacher Nanabush (Weesageechak, Raven, 
Coyote) make visible cycles of abuse and their sources. The Trickster-
teacher straddles the consciousness of humanity and the Great Spirit, 
the physical and spiritual, past and present, is neither he nor she, and 
is very much “the worse for wear and tear” since colonization (12–13). 
The residents of the Wasaychigan (window) reserve have lived with their 
problems for so long that those problems are invisible because appar-
ently so natural. Now, “before the healing can take place, the poison 
must fi rst be exposed” (as the epigraph from Lyle Longclaws makes 
clear). The play begins with signs of neglect and cultural domination 
(a Marilyn Monroe poster) overlooking the remains of a party, Zachary 
Jeremiah Keechigeesick’s “bare, naked bum” and Nanabush/Gazelle 
Nataways with the markers of objectifi ed womanhood: “a gigantic pair 
of false, rubberized breasts” and the fi rst words are a symptom of oppres-
sion within the Native community: “Hey, bitch!” (15–16). 
Unlike those concerned to manage cultural diversity, Highway is not 
content with recording the visible signs of cultural difference. Instead he 
is concerned to unravel the multiple and confl icted histories that explain 
the current state of affairs and to do so by drawing on English, Ojibway, 
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and Cree as well as classical, Christian, and Aboriginal myth. The jour-
ney of discovery as recovery and redress connects current conditions 
inside the reserve to a history of colonization, to the persistent power 
of sexism, racism, capitalism inside and outside. We register the repeti-
tion of past colonial violence in current patterns of domestic violence, 
external racism internalized as sexist abuse so that, as Maracle claims, 
“men have a vested interest in holding on to the issue of racism, be-
cause then the enemy is external” (Kelly 80). In the process Aboriginals 
and non-Aboriginals alike recognize the legacy of the so-called “gifts” of 
colonization (alcohol, disease, guns, and the institutions of patriarchy, 
education, religion, law, and medicine): dispossession, confi nement, 
poverty, crime, violence, and the fetal alcohol syndrome that literally 
silences Dickie Bird (Cockney rhyming slang for “not a word”—and a 
nice reminder of resistance at the heart of empire). In reliving and even 
repeating the past, characters (and audience) learn to stop laying blame 
elsewhere—“That wasn’t my fault, Joe. It’s that witch woman of yours 
Gazelle Nataways” (23)—and come to an understanding of collective 
accountability. Thus, characters acknowledge that “we were all there” 
(85) and none had intervened to stop the self-abuse and come to the 
rescue of Gazelle Nataways and her unborn child. In learning to respect 
community sanctions, they stop indulging in forms of singular scape-
goating too often supported by the judicial system.
Remembering the words of the Canadian Judicial Council and Brecht 
(with whom I began) can help us maintain an optimum awareness of au-
diences and outcomes. Such awareness, I would argue, should not mean 
the zealous defence of purity or objectivity but of productive hybridity 
empowering faculty research and student curiosity. It is not a matter of 
moving the mental furniture in a limiting add-on fashion as much as fur-
nishing mental and social movement in modes of exchange both respect-
ful and rigorous. Productive hybridity remains easier to articulate than 
to accomplish. Consider the resistance to and backlash against Patricia 
Williams, Patricia Monture-Angus, Sheila McIntyre, the Supreme Court 
of Canada, and Tomson Highway. Yet, we need a critical mass of faculty 
and a mass of critical students, and that requires at all stages effectively 
transformative communication across communities of redress. 
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Hence, my emphasis is on connecting Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
students and not only to the net! But to many histories, literatures, and 
knowledges that will serve them and others well inside and outside the 
academy so that we can derive strength from our many peoples (as the 
Saskatchewan motto in my title suggests). That means, as Monture-
Angus suggests, “shar[ing] the defi nitional power that creates the legiti-
macy whereby words and phrases gain their accepted meaning” and at-
tending to the ways that English “sanctions particular worldviews” and 
is experienced in “hierarchical and gendered” and even “colonial” ways 
(Journeying 43). It means too not leaving all the work of history to pro-
fessional, academic historians but attending to the elders, story-tellers, 
and writers in Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal culture—and not show-
ing undue reverence to male authorities of either culture: the Supreme 
Court’s 1990 Sparrow decision, for example, cited only male non-
Aboriginal authorities (Monture-Angus Journeying 113). 
We need to recognize what “we” take for granted—our languages, 
history, and culture—and the identities and legitimacies they entail. We 
might recall the privilege of carrying on conversations in our own lan-
guages and consider the experience of “the contradictions that arise for 
those of us who are continually forced to negotiate, converse and dis-
cuss in a second and foreign language” (Monture-Angus Thunder 264). 
Justice Gerald Morin has talked about the value of the Cree court estab-
lished in Northern Saskatchewan as access to legitimacy, as, importantly, 
the experience, the feeling of empowerment and justice by those given 
voice in their own terms. Then we might better appreciate the lessons 
of Tomson Highway who on behalf of the true “aristocrats” of the land 
welcomes us to share that land (“Tomson Highway”). 
I do not claim to speak on behalf of Aboriginal peoples or share an-
thropological assumptions about the knowable other, reducing cultural 
complexities and identities to a matter of material practices and the aca-
demic management and consumption of difference. Nor do I want to 
promote academic careerism (“I do postcolonial studies) that thrives on 
the oppression of Indigenous or other marginalized groups (much as 
nineteenth-century professionalizing depended on the monitoring and 
measuring of the underclasses). We should never forget that “research is 
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probably one of the dirtiest words in the indigenous world’s vocabulary” 
and colonialism has meant disconnecting Indigenous peoples from their 
histories and languages and forms of “systematic fragmentation” that 
put their skulls in museums, art work in private collections, “customs” 
to anthropologists, and languages in the hands of linguists (Smith 1, 
28). Teaching and collaborating with others across disciplines and cul-
tures has taught me, however, the importance of historicizing, theoriz-
ing, and Indigenizing notions of authority, identity, difference, and lan-
guage as a means of identifying intellectual roadblocks and reproductive 
engines built into the institutions we inhabit. In this context too show-
ing solidarity with Aboriginal peoples and emphasizing the specifi cities 
of the production of difference might help us eventually dislodge the co-
lonial and neo-colonial paradigms that we have inherited in the names 
of truth, knowledge, and an endlessly well-intentioned mission and that 
we have deployed in the name(s) of justice.
Notes
 1 Versions of this paper were presented at the third annual meeting of the 
Working Group on Law, Culture and the Humanities, Georgetown Law Center, 
Washington, DC, 10–12 March 2000, and the meetings of the Association of 
Canadian College and University Teachers of English at the annual Congress of 
the Social Sciences and Humanities, University of Alberta, Edmonton, 24–27 
May 2000. I gratefully acknowledge the generous and suggestive comments of 
the reviewers of this essay. I am as always grateful to James (Sakej) Youngblood 
Henderson, Marie Battiste, Lynne Bell, and Len Findlay for ongoing and enrich-
ing discussions on issues of difference, law, and postcolonial justice.
 2 For a fuller discussion of the embeddedness of colonial thinking in the law and 
efforts to displace colonial discourse, see Henderson, Benson and Findlay, espe-
cially 247–329.
 3 See, for instance, Daniel Jutras’ argument for comparative legal scholarship in 
considering the relationship of everyday life and state law.
 4 Building on the critical turn of such scholars as Roberto Unger and Duncan 
Kennedy, Critical Legal Studies (CLS) has been concerned to demystify legal 
reasoning and underline its indeterminate, value-laden, and political charac-
ter. Not content with CLS efforts to change thinking, Critical Race Theory 
(CRT)—associated in the US with Patricia Williams, Mari J. Matsude, Charles 
R. Lawrence III, Richard Delgado, and Kimberlè Williams Crenshaw, among 
others—is explicitly political and activist in its orientation, analyzing the role of 
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racism and the experience of people of colour, recognizing the limits of rights 
discourses, and seeing in the law both a resource and a powerful source of in-
equality. John Borrows, Patricia Monture, Mary Ellen Turpel-Lafond, and James 
(Sakej) Youngblood Henderson elaborate what CTR can mean for Aboriginal 
peoples seeking justice in Canada, while Carole A. Aylward and Constance 
Backhouse add importantly to the history of racism and the law in Canada. 
Monture, Turpel-Lafond, and Sherene Razack have likewise been powerful voic-
es for women’s issues, working to ensure that gender is not treated as an isolated 
category but one of several intersecting systems of domination in the context of 
law and justice.
 5 For a wonderfully enlightening and entertaining fable for non-Aboriginal peo-
ples on “their own distinct (or distinctive?) cultural context” (995), see Barsh 
and Henderson.
 6 In addition to Findlay, “Just Expression” and Williams, Alchemy discussed 
later in this essay, see Canada Law and Learning ; Razack, Looking ; Borrows, 
Introduction, Recovering Canada ; and Costello, “Schooled by the Classroom” 
for thoughtful critiques of legal education.
 7 On the need of a contextualized understanding of difference and the complicity 
of scholarship in producing and reproducing inequalities, see Razack, Looking, 
and Razack, ed. Race. Patrick Macklem’s emphasis on legal-cultural hybridity, 
his refusal to reduce Indigenous difference to cultural difference, and his atten-
tiveness to “history and context” (4–29) lead him in directions similar to those 
pursued by Henderson, Benson and Findlay.
 8 For a fuller discussion of the case, see Findlay, “Discourse.”
 9 For some recent media examples, see Ibbitson and Chase; Wallace; “The 
Supreme Court All At Sea.” Far from seeing juridical activism as a threat, Kelly 
and Murphy argue that it deepens constitutional supremacy (3–27).
 10 On “the cold game of equality staring,” see Raznack, Looking, 23–35; Williams, 
Alchemy. See too Macklem, Indigenous Difference.
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